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1. The recent Commission’s Proposal (herein simply the 
Proposal)1 to revise the Brussels I Regulation, (herein simply the 
Regulation) on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judg-
ments in civil and commercial matters, the Proposal that follows 
the Report on the application of the Regulation2 and the Green 
 
 Secretary General, Chamber of Arbitration of Milan. The opinions here 
expressed are those of the Authors, and they do not reflect the official position 
of the Milan Chamber of Arbitration, nor are binding upon it. 
 JD, University of Milan. 
1 COM(2010) 748 final of 14 December 2010. For a first assessment of the 
Proposal, see ILLMER M., “Brussels I and Arbitration Revisited. The European 
Commission’s Proposal COM(2010) 748 final”, RabelsZ 2011, 645 ff; RADICA-
TI DI BROZOLO L.G., “Arbitration and the Draft Revised Brussels I Regulation: 
Seeds of Home Country Control and of Harmonization?”, JPIL 2011, 423 ff. 
The Commission, in formulating the Proposal, took into account results of 
various studies and of consultations among interested parties, and in particular 
of a 2007 study on the practical application of the Regulation known as the 
Heidelberg Report. On the HESS B./PFEIFFER T./SCHLOSSER P., Heidelberg 
Report from the Italian perspective, see CONSOLO C., “Arbitration and EC Law. 
An Italian Reaction in the Heidelberg Colloquium”, Int. Arb. L.R. 2009, 49 ff. 
2 Report on the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001. The 
Report has shown that the interface between the Regulation and arbitration 
raises difficulties. In particular, the following critical issues were raised: the 
phenomenon of parallel court and arbitration proceedings, the incompatibility 
with the Regulation of procedural devices under the national law aimed at 
strengthening the effectiveness of arbitration agreements (such as anti-suit 
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Paper on the review of the Regulation,3 presents some innovative 
aspects regarding the interface between the Regulation and 
arbitration. 
The Chamber of Arbitration of Milan, an arbitral institution 
actively operating at domestic and international level, has 
analysed the practical impact of the Proposal on arbitration and 
on its arbitration proceedings. 
At first, it should be said that the Proposal has not had a great 
impact on institutional arbitration. The impact on arbitration 
proceedings administered by the Milan Chamber relates to the 
rules determining the seat of arbitration and the moment when 
the arbitral tribunal is considered seized (see § 3). The Proposal 
does not have any particular effects on the mechanisms of admi-
nistration of the procedure. As far as other issues are concerned, 
the Milan Chamber can express its own comments as an 
interested party only. 
In 2009, the Milan Chamber of Arbitration submitted to the 
European Commission a Position Paper,4 taking a position on the 
proposed amendments of the Green Paper. The Position Paper 
 
injunctions), the lack of a uniform allocation of jurisdiction in proceedings 
supportive of arbitration proceedings, the doubts about the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments on the validity of an arbitration clause or setting aside 
an arbitral award and, finally, the issues related to the recognition and enfor-
cement of arbitral awards, governed by the New York Convention, considered 
less swift and efficient than the recognition and enforcement of judgments. 
3 Green Paper on the review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001. The 
Green Paper, which accompanies the Report on the application of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 44/2001, with respect to the points raised in the Report, 
raises a series of questions to the interested parties launching a broad consul-
tation on possible ways to improve the operation of the Regulation. In the matter 
of the interface between the Regulation and arbitration, the Green Paper has 
proposed a series of amendments, including the well-known partial deletion of 
the exclusion of arbitration from the scope of the Regulation. The Green Paper 
also asked the interested parties in Question 7 which action they consider to be 
appropriate at Community level to strengthen the effectiveness of arbitration 
agreements, to ensure a good coordination between judicial and arbitration pro-
ceedings, and to enhance the effectiveness of arbitration awards.  
4 The Position Paper of the Milan Chamber of Arbitration has been 
adopted, after a consultation, by its Arbitral Council on 23 June 2009, and is 
available on the institution’s website www.camera-arbitrale.it. Other institutions 
and experts submitted their comments to the European Commission. Those that 
deserve to be mentioned are the reports of the Association for International 
Arbitration, the French Committee on Arbitration of the ICC, and the 
Arbitration Committee of the International Bar Association, all available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/consulting_public/news/consulting_publi
c/news_consulting_002_en.htm. 
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also remarks on the abolition of the current exclusion of arbi-
tration from the scope of the Regulation, the so-called “arbi-
tration exclusion”, of Article 1(2)(d) of the Regulation, which 
states that the Regulation shall not apply to arbitration. 
The current position of the Milan center, in comparison with 
the 2009 position, could be more flexible. In 2009, an EU inter-
vention on arbitration did not seem necessary. Today, in light of 
the international debate on arbitration and the case law regarding 
intra-EU conflicts on issues related to arbitration, the possibility 
of the European Union opening to arbitration seems more 
acceptable. As a further positive aspect, the current Proposal, in 
comparison with the proposal of the Green Paper on which the 
Chamber made its comments, is not affected by the initial 
dogmatism and does not try to introduce a discipline governing 
any possible conflict between States’ courts and arbitration, pro-
posing to the contrary a less pervasive solution.5 
It is true that there are other conventions regulating arbi-
tration, starting from the 1958 New York Convention, which was 
signed by all Member States. Also, it is true that a further regu-
lation, in the wake of the regulatory trend of the recent years, 
could create more conflicts.6 But it is also true that recently some 
 
5 The initial proposal, contained in the Green Paper, would entail 
substantial changes in the national law of arbitration of the different Member 
States and, for this reason, has been criticized. Among the various contributions, 
see PINSOLLE P., “The Proposed Reform of Regulation 44/2001: A Poison Pill 
for Arbitration in the European Union”, Int. Arb. L.R. 2009, 62 ff; RADICATI DI 
BROZOLO L.G., “Choice of Court and Arbitration Agreements and the Review of 
the Brussels I Regulation”, IPRax 2010, 124 ff; DRAETTA U./SANTINI A., 
“Arbitration Exception and Brussels I Regulation: no need for change”, DCI 
2009, 547 ff. Among the most problematic provisions, the denial of Kompetenz-
Kompetenz rule, in providing that on the validity of the arbitration agreement 
should be decided by the judges (and not the arbitrators) of the Member State of 
the seat of arbitration (see fn 23). 
6 Such as the result of the Heidelberg Report and noted by the international 
doctrine. In this regard, see MOURRE A., “Should arbitration stay excluded from 
the scope of application of Regulation 44/2001?”, ASA Bull. 2006, 800 ff; VAN 
HAERSOLTE-VAN HOF J.J., “The Arbitration Exception in the Brussels 
Convention: Further Comment”, J. Int. Arb. 2001, 27 ff; VAN HOUTTE H., “Why 
Not Include in the Brussels Jurisdiction Regulation?”, Arb. Int. 2005, 509 ff; 
BERAUDO J.-P., “The Arbitration Exception of the Brussels and Lugano 
Convention: Jurisdiction, Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments”, J. Int. 
Arb. 2001, 13 ff, for which the drafters of the Convention did not want to add 
new instruments to the already-expanding corpus of international treaties 
regulating arbitration and the recognition of arbitral awards. 
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doubts have arisen regarding the proper functioning of the New 
York Convention in the European Union.7 
At the European level, there is no uniform application of the 
New York Convention, because each Member State interprets its 
rules differently. On one hand, this has created a strong compe-
tition among the different legal systems, which has fostered the 
progress of arbitration.8 On the other hand, such a situation gives 
rise to some anomalies in the functioning of the system, such as 
parallel proceedings, with conflicting decisions, which under-
mine the certainty and the stability of commercial relations in the 
EU internal market.9 
Moreover, there are no jurisdictional criteria covering the 
courts’ proceedings, ancillary proceedings in arbitration or 
uniform rules on the application of the Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
principle. For example, it may happen that, in order to delay and 
elude the action, a party bound by an arbitration agreement could 
bring the dispute before the ordinary courts. And that same party, 
in objection to the exception raised by the other party, opposes 
the validity or efficacy of the arbitration agreement. Consequently, 
the judge declares the invalidity of the arbitration agreement and 
decides the proceedings on the merits, a decision that is able to 
circulate in the European Union pursuant to the Regulation. At 
the same time, arbitral proceedings could take place in another 
Member State at the seat of arbitration, leading to an arbitral 
award that is in contrast with the judgment, but subject to res 
 
7 However, even recently, part of the doctrine continues to argue that no 
relevant problems arise to justify a review. Among others, DRAETTA U./SANTINI 
A. (fn 5), 552 f., for which “the present system has worked well for arbitration 
so far … [t]he practitioners’ view is that the few cases where problems have 
occurred within the EU during the last 40 years with regard to the recognition 
and enforcement of judicial decisions relating to arbitration do not justify far-
reaching amendments of the Regulation”, and they make explicit reference to 
the “IBA Submission to the European Regulation (EC) No 44/2001” (see fn 4) 
in supporting their statement. The Authors argue that the Commission, when 
drafting its proposal on the review of the Regulation, should not delete the 
arbitration exception. It should also be noted that the statement of the Authors is 
placed at the end of a critical analysis of the proposal contained in Green Paper 
(and not in the one contained in the most recent and softened Proposal). 
8 RADICATI DI BROZOLO L.G. (fn 1), at 425. 
9 Also, the HESS B./PFEIFFER T./SCHLOSSER P., Heidelberg Report has 
admitted the proper functioning of the 1958 New York Convention, on the basis 
of the opinions (see fn 15) which led to the drafting the report, but at the same 
time has highlighted a number of problems related to the arbitration exception of 
the Regulation. This sort of contradiction is also contained in the Green Paper, 
see DRAETTA U./SANTINI A. (fn 5), at 551. 
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judicata. This example demonstrates the seriousness of the 
phenomenon, not only with respect to arbitration ‒ from a Euro-
pean perspective, and not only the arbitration community ‒ but 
also with respect to the certainty of law and contractual relations 
intra-Union. 
This situation, at least in the European context, seems to be 
imputable, together with the problems related to the application 
of the New York Convention and the domestic laws, to the 
exclusion of arbitration from the scope of the Regulation. The 
exclusion concerns not only the recognition and enforcement of 
arbitral awards, covered by the New York Convention and the 
national laws, but also ‒ and especially ‒ the proceedings in 
support to arbitration. Proceedings in support of arbitration in-
clude provisional proceedings to determine the arbitration agree-
ment’s effects until the constitution of the arbitral tribunal as well 
as proceedings on the validity of arbitration agreements. These 
proceedings, in absence of a uniform lis pendens rule, are not ma-
naged, nor are manageable, at the European level. 
In particular, the problem arises when the proceedings on the 
validity of the arbitration agreement, pursuant to Article II(3) of 
the New York Convention, are not recognized in a decision by a 
judge of another Member State, because the arbitration pro-
ceedings do not fall within the scope of the Regulation. Thus, the 
arbitration exception is applicable, not Article 32, which defines 
the judgment that the Member States shall recognize. 
However, up to now, and despite all these anomalies, there 
were no significant problems in practice. Or, rather, the Court of 
Justice has always been able to solve these problems without 
difficulty by providing, through well-known cases, a series of 
interpretative criteria that have filled the gaps of the system, 
without the need of legislative interventions.10 More recently, 
however, conflicts between Member States have become frequent 
and the Court’s decisions are in some ways unacceptable for sup-
porters of arbitration. Thus, the idea of a legislative intervention 
 
10 See ECJ, 25 July 1991, Case C-190/89, March Rich & Co. AG v Società 
Italiana Impianti PA [1991] ECR 3855. See the commentaries by, respectively, 
MAYER P., Rev. crit. dr. int. pr. 1993, 316 ff; and HUET A., Clunet 1992, 488 ff; 
see also GAIA G., “Arbitrato e procedimento giudiziario in Stati diversi dopo la 
sentenza della Corte di giustizia nella causa March Rich c. Italimpianti”, Riv. 
arb. 1995, 417 ff. See also ECJ, 17 November 1998, Case C-391/95, Van Uden 
Maritime BV v Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line [1998] ECR 7091. 
For a comment, see PETTINATO C., “Provvedimenti provvisori e arbitrato nella 
Convenzione di Bruxelles del 1968”, Riv. arb. 1999, 313 ff. 
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by the European Union to solve the difficult relationship between 
arbitration and the Regulation has been raised. 
The difficulties have become more frequent after the decision 
of the Court of Justice in the famous West Tankers case.11 Taking 
no notice of the anti-suit injunction remedy, typical of common 
law systems, the Court in this case has established that the use of 
such remedy is not consistent with the Brussels I regime, under 
which the judges of a Member State are forbidden to control how 
the judges of other Member States affirm or deny their own 
jurisdiction. This principle also applies not just to actions before 
a national court, but to arbitration, which is a matter excluded 
from the Brussels I regime. In fact, in the West Tankers case, 
although the anti-suit injunctions remedy was intended to protect 
an arbitration agreement and not a lawsuit pending before a 
national court, as in the Gasser and Turner cases that the Court 
mentions,12 the Court of Justice, ignoring the arbitration 
exception, applied the Regulation and its principles, precluding 
the use of anti-suit injunctions.13 
 
11 The proceedings that led the Court of Justice to the decision mentioned 
here, commenced on 10 December, 2004 by West Tankers against Italian 
insurance companies Generali and Allianz, sued after the compensation of the 
insured Erg. The High Court was asked to declare that the parties were bound by 
the arbitration clause contained in the lease agreement originally signed between 
West Tankers and the insured and to grant an anti-suit injunction to protect the 
arbitration proceedings. See West Tankers Inc. v Riunione Adriatica di Sicurtà 
S.p.A. and others [2005] EWHC (Comm) 454; and West Tankers Inc. v Riunione 
Adriatica di Sicurtà S.p.A. and others [2007] UKHL 4. On a preliminary reference 
by the House of Lords the issue was decided by the European Court of Justice, 
ECJ, 10 February 2009, Case C-185/07, Allianz S.p.A. (formerly Riunione 
Adriatica di Sicurtà S.p.A.), Generali Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., v West 
Tankers Inc. [2009] ECR 663. Among the first commentaries, see DAVIES K., 
Whereto now, the Italian Torpedo, available on Kluwerarbitrationblog, 16 May 
2011; WINKLER M.M., “West Tankers: la Corte di Giustizia conferma l’in-
ammissibilità delle anti-suit injunctions anche in ambito escluso dal-
l’applicazione del Regolamento Bruxelles I”, DCI 2008, 375 ff.  
12 ECJ, 9 December 2003, Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT 
S.r.l. [2003] ECR 14693. For comments, see ROMANO G.P., “Le principe de sé-
curité juridique à l’éprouve des arrêts Gasser et Owusu”, Cahiers dr. eur. 2008, 
175 ff; FENTIMAN R., “Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl”, 
CMLR 2005, 241 ff.; and ECJ, 27 April 2004, Case C-159/02, Turner v Grovit 
[2004] ECR 3565. See the critical comments of KRUGER T., “The Anti-Suit 
Injunction in the European Judicial Space: Turner v. Grovit”, ICLQ 2004, 1030 ff. 
13 WINKLER M.M. (fn 11), at 739. 
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In light of these decisions and others,14 it is clear that the 
current European system ‒ consisting of the New York Con-
vention, the exception of the Brussels I Regulation, and the 
national laws of the Member States ‒ could, and should, be im-
proved. Some countries, although supporting the New York Con-
vention,15 start to raise some criticisms. 
What is not desirable is a modification of the functioning of 
arbitration by pervasive rules imposed by a European legislator, 
like the ones proposed in the Green Paper, because arbitration 
works properly. What is desirable is the introduction of a few 
rules of coordination able to deal with the difficulties that arise in 
practice and due to national differences. The latest Proposal 
seems to go in this direction, presenting a few rules on arbitration 
that, taken together, produce less consequences compared to 
previous proposals.16 But another question arises: does it make 
sense to harmonize, in a context such as the European Union, an 
instrument that has ‒ and must have ‒ an international character? 
If the New York Convention is able to ensure harmony at the 
international level, does it make sense to jeopardize this harmony 
by adding a new regulation and regionalizing arbitration?17 
 
14 For a roundup of the best known recent cases that demonstrate a failure 
of the arbitration system intra-Union, see RADICATI DI BROZOLO L. G. (fn 1), at 
427 ff. 
15 The HESS B./PFEIFFER T./SCHLOSSER P., Heidelberg Report, following a 
consultation with Member States and interested parties, found that most of the 
interviewed stakeholders did not see any need for an extension since the New 
York Convention was working very well. In this sense the opinions of Austria, 
Belgium, Cyprus, England, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Malta, 
Netherlands, Scotland, and Spain. With regard to the positions of national 
reporters about the relationship between Regulation and New York Convention, 
we can find expressions like “proper functioning” (England), “satisfied with the 
New York Convention …] deemed to work properly” (France), “the New York 
Convention provide an efficient system” (Italy), “the New York Convention is 
generally considered to be adequate” (Netherlands). However, different levels of 
satisfaction emerged. Some, although satisfied with the system, pointed out the 
presence of anomalies. In particular, the English report “expressly stresses the 
advantage of the English practice to enforce the integrity of an arbitration 
agreement by an anti-suit injunction. However, the recognition of these 
injunctions in other Member States is far from clear, as the Regulation does not 
apply”. The English fears have been confirmed in West Tankers case. 
16 RADICATI DI BROZOLO L.G. (fn 1), at 449. 
17 Among the many answers in negative, see DRAETTA U./SANTINI A. (fn 
5), at 553, for which international arbitration is a product of international trade 
law … is global in nature and yet subject to the various national laws, [whereas] 
EU law is regional and tends to achieve uniformity in national laws. Then, the 
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2. The above-mentioned problems are, on a theoretical level, 
subject to different solutions, which have been widely dis-
cussed.18 For instance, is it possible to include within the scope of 
the Regulation proceedings to support arbitration, such as pro-
ceedings on the validity and effects of the arbitration agreement, 
provisional, and protective measures? Is it possible to protect 
arbitration agreements, not by the English remedy of the anti-suit 
injunction, but by a rule that establishes the so-called “negative 
effect” of Kompetenz-Kompetenz? In other words, is it possible to 
create a rule that will stay the proceedings before the national 
court until the arbitral tribunal reaches a decision on its own 
jurisdiction? 
It is not possible to assimilate and to submit arbitral awards 
and judgments of national courts to the same rules. And it is not 
possible to proceed to the pure and simple abolition of the arbi-
tration exception. In principle, arbitration, for its peculiarities, 
must be excluded from the scope of the Regulation, which 
governs the recognition and enforcement of any decision ren-
dered by a court or tribunal of a Member State (Article 32 of the 
Regulation). 
Also the opposite solution of an expansion of the exclusion,19 
thus allowing the use of anti-suit injunctions to protect 
arbitration, cannot meet consensus (except for the English 
community of arbitration) because it is contrary to the principle 
of “mutual trust” between the courts of the Member States, which 
is one of the key principles of the European Union, as confirmed 
by the Court of Justice in the West Tankers case. In addition, anti-
suit injunctions are remedies only available before the English 
courts and assuming an extension of this remedy to other 
countries, through similar instruments or counter-anti-suit 
injunctions, it will not be a solution to the problems but rather 
give rise to further conflicts.20 
A third solution, which is a sort of compromise compared to 
the two above mentioned, adopted by the Commission in the 
 
Authors associate the idea of a European arbitration law to the idea essentially 
failed of a European contract law. 
18 In addition to HESS B./PFEIFFER T./SCHLOSSER P., Heidelberg Report, 
see the Commission’s “Impact assessment of the proposal for the review of 
Regulation 44/2001”, SEC(2010), at 1547. 
19 It seems to be the solution proposed by the European Parliament which 
has made a series of amendments to the Commission Proposal. See Committee 
on Legal Affairs, Rapporteur T. ZWIEFKA, Draft Report. 
20 RADICATI DI BROZOLO L.G. (fn 1), at 432. 
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Proposal, is the partial abolition of the arbitration exception. This 
solution is accomplished without the imposition of a significant 
regulation on arbitration at European level, but rather through 
few rules only. The solution would create a discipline that simply 
establishes some key principles ‒ such as Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
‒ essential for the proper functioning of arbitration, and recog-
nizes a certain margin of freedom to the Member States. 
Another solution is found in developing an overall regulation 
on arbitration, by means of rules for the harmonization of arbi-
tration national laws. However, it seems difficult, if not 
impossible, to implement this solution because arbitration laws 
(and attitude) of the individual Member States differ from each 
other too significantly.21 The favor arbitrati of certain countries, 
and the hostility of others, continually emerge in the practice of 
international arbitration and make uniformity very difficult to be 
reached. 
The last option would be to maintain the status quo since the 
problems of the current system are not so serious to justify a 
legislative intervention. However, even if there are no serious 
situations but critical issues of the system, today a European 
action over the Member States appears almost inevitable.  
 
3. The Commission’s Proposal on arbitration to revise the 
Regulation seems to be a compromise solution. As a general rule, 
the exclusion of arbitration from the scope of the Regulation is 
confirmed by the Proposal. It is also clarified that the Regulation 
“does not apply to the form, the existence, validity and effects of 
arbitration agreements, the powers of the arbitrators, the 
procedure before arbitral tribunals, and the validity, annulment, 
and recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards” (Recital 11). 
The Proposal envisages the introduction of some special rules 
aimed at avoid[ing] parallel proceedings and abusive litigation 
tactics, when “the agreed upon or designated seat of an arbi-
tration is in a Member State” (Recital 20). And the same Recital 
clarifies that seat of arbitration means the seat selected by the 
parties or designated by an arbitral tribunal, arbitral institution or 
any other authority directly or indirectly chosen by the parties. 
These special rules are substantiated in Article 29(4), which lays 
down a specific lis pendens rule for arbitration: “[W]here the 
agreed or designated seat of an arbitration is in a Member State, 
 
21 RADICATI DI BROZOLO L.G. (fn 1), at 434. 
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the courts of another Member State whose jurisdiction is 
contested on the basis of an arbitration agreement shall stay 
proceedings once the courts of the Member State where the seat 
of the arbitration is located or the arbitral tribunal have been 
seised of proceedings to determine, as their main object or as an 
incidental question, the existence, validity or effects of that 
arbitration agreement”. 
In the two preceding paragraphs, it is clarified that the 
national court whose jurisdiction is contested may decline juris-
diction immediately, if so prescribed by its national law.22 And 
the court may decline jurisdiction if and when the existence, 
validity or effects of the arbitration agreement is established by 
the court of the seat or by the arbitral tribunal. It is also clarified 
that this rule does not apply to disputes arising from consumer 
contracts, insurance contracts, and employment relationships. 
As instrumental rules for the proper workability of this 
provision, the Proposal has introduced two additional rules on 
arbitration: one to define the moment when the arbitral tribunal is 
considered seized (Article 33(3)), and the other to establish the 
ways to determine the seat of arbitration (Recital 20). With 
regard to the first of these two rules, it follows the same purpose 
as Article 33(1) of the Proposal for court proceedings. However, 
Article 33(3) indicates the appointment of the arbitrator, when a 
party has nominated an arbitrator, as the decisive moment. This 
seems to refer, if placed in the Italian context, to the moment in 
which the party promotes the proceedings, filing the request, and 
appointing the arbitrator and not to the moment of the party’s 
acceptance. Or, more specifically, to the moment in which the 
defendant has notice of it. We should also specify that since the 
request for arbitration and the appointment could be filed in two 
different moments, the decisive moment is the receipt of such 
appointment. In the case that an appointing authority exists, the 
decisive moment is the filing of the appointment request with the 
Secretariat of the institution, the office of the authority, or the 
filing of the recourse with the President of the court. 
As far as the criteria to determine the seat of the arbitration 
are concerned, Recital 20 states that it should be the one agreed 
by the parties. Or, in case of no indication by the parties, the one 
 
22 This is the case in France. See Article 1448 of the French Code of Civil 
Procedure introduced by the latest reform; reform that has confirmed and 
translated into law the negative effect of Kompetenz-Kompetenz as recognized 
by case law. 
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designated by the arbitral tribunal, the arbitral institution or the 
authority that the parties, directly or not, have chosen.  
In this regard, it may be useful to compare this solution with 
the previous one contained in the Green Paper. The solution 
contained in the Green Paper has been criticized by the Milan 
Chamber of Arbitration for recognizing the exclusive jurisdiction 
to the judges of the Member States of the seat of arbitration for 
court proceedings in support of arbitration. The Green Paper 
further proposed, in the case of no indication of the arbitration 
seat by the parties or by the arbitrators, to refer to “the courts of 
the Member State, which would have jurisdiction over the 
dispute under the Regulation in the absence of an arbitration 
agreement”.23 The current Proposal takes a different and more 
acceptable direction, respecting the parties’ freedom and their 
choice for an institutional arbitration. Generally speaking, the 
Proposal is more consistent with the international standard of 
commercial arbitration.24 
The Milan Chamber of Arbitration welcomes the possibility 
for the arbitral institution to fix the seat of arbitration, as 
contained in Recital 20. The Chamber’s rules contain a provision, 
 
23 The notion of the seat of arbitration contained in the Green Paper does 
not include the possibility of designating the seat of arbitration by an arbitral 
institution or by reference to specific rules or, in case of no indication by the 
parties and the arbitral tribunal, by recourse to the court. Moreover, the Green 
Paper identifies such on the basis of the uniform criteria imposed by the 
Regulation for the identification of the competent court in the absence of an 
arbitration agreement (“the courts of the Member State which would have 
jurisdiction over the dispute under the Regulation in the absence of an arbi-
tration agreement”). This would have favored the so-called “forum shopping” by 
offering different options to the claimant: the court of the place of domicile of 
the defendant (Article 2) and the court of the place where the obligation is to be 
performed (Article 5(1)). This would offer one of the parties, on its own 
initiative and without the consent of the other party, the possibility to place the 
seat of arbitration in a State rather than in another, without considering that the 
seat, in arbitration, should not be selected on the basis of unilateral, 
opportunistic evaluations. Also the proposed exclusive jurisdiction for ancillary 
proceedings seems inappropriate, being extended to provisional and evidentiary 
measures in respect of which the parties should be free to resort, as established 
in Article 31 of the Regulation (and, by the Court of Justice, in the Van Uden 
case), to any judge where the provisional measures are to be enforced or where 
the evidence is located. In this sense, see the reports of the Milan Chamber of 
Arbitration and of the International Bar Association. See fn 4. 
24 To determine the seat, the Proposal takes into account parties’ will (as 
expressed in the arbitration agreement), then the designation of the arbitrators, of 
the arbitral institution or of another authority chosen, directly or not, by the 
parties. 
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Article 4, for the determination of the seat that may support the 
new mechanism.25 The definition of seat, provided by Recital 20, 
applies either to ad hoc arbitration or to institutional arbitration. 
Thus, parties’ freedom in choosing the seat of arbitration by 
means of an arbitral institution, or referring to rules, is granted. 
It is important to underline that the indication of the seat of 
arbitration, at least in the arbitration clauses examined by the 
Milan Chamber of Arbitration in its practice, is not very frequent. 
This is especially so because parties do not pay attention to this 
aspect, often taking into account the seat only as the location 
where the hearings will materially take place. Thus, the inter-
vention of the institution and its rules become crucial for the 
identification of this frequently missing aspect. 
Besides Article 29(4) and the related provisions, the Proposal 
does not include further arbitration provisions. Therefore, the 
current Proposal seems to be less pervasive than the previous 
ones dated 2009. Moreover, the general inapplicability of the 
Regulation to arbitration under Article 1(2)(d) still exists. 
No provisions about the applicability of the Regulation to the 
judgments concerning arbitration have been included. Judgments 
that are still outside the scope of the Regulation give happiness to 
the many skeptics of any kind of EU arbitration Regulation and 
give disappointment to the few who expected something more. 
Four kinds of judgments in matter of arbitration may be 
considered:26 judgments of the State of the seat on the validity 
and effects of the arbitration agreement, judgments of the State of 
the seat on the validity and effects of arbitral awards, judgments 
recognizing arbitration awards ‒ governed by the New York 
Convention and the national laws ‒ and, finally, judgments on the 
merits rendered by Member State courts in relation to any dispute 
falling on the application of an arbitration agreement.  
Under the Proposal, all these arbitration-related judgments 
remain outside the scope of the Regulation. However, according 
to the new system provided by Article 29(4) for judgments on the 
 
25 Article 4 CAM Rules (Seat of the Arbitration). “1. The parties shall fix 
the seat of the arbitration, in Italy or abroad, in their arbitration agreement. 2. In 
the absence of any agreement as to the seat, the seat of the arbitration shall be 
Milan. 3. Notwithstanding the provision in paragraph 2, the Arbitral Council 
may fix the seat of the arbitration elsewhere, taking into account the requests of 
the parties and any another circumstance. 4. The Arbitral Tribunal may 
determine that hearings or other procedural acts take place in a location other 
than the seat”. 
26 RADICATI DI BROZOLO L.G. (fn 1), at 450 ff. 
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validity and effects of the arbitration agreement, if the State 
upholds the validity of an arbitration agreement, such decision 
has to be considered final and binding for the non-seat court. 
Thus, a judge of the European Union shall not decide the case on 
the merits and shall deny its jurisdiction. Undoubtedly, this is 
positive in relation to the Commission’s purposes and as an 
expression of favor arbitrati. 
Arbitration is also mentioned in Article 36 concerning the 
provisional and protective measures. It states that an application 
may be made to the courts of a Member State for provisional 
measures, including protective measures that may be available 
under the law of that State. This is true even if the courts of 
another State or, under the new provision, an arbitral tribunal 
have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter. As clarified by 
European case law,27 the application applies to national courts, 
even if there is an arbitral tribunal that is competent on the merits.  
 
4. At this stage, we should wonder whether the Proposal does 
reach the Commission’s goals, as well as whether it avoids 
parallel proceedings and abuses. The analysis conducted by some 
authors28 seems to be very useful. 
The non-seat court’s obligation to stay proceedings, pursuant 
to Article 29(4), seems to take this direction: the ordinary judge 
invested with the dispute subject to arbitration agreement (if 
different from the one of the seat), is forced to stay the 
proceedings, when a party invokes the arbitration agreement, and 
to invest the judge of the seat or the arbitral tribunal with the 
matter of the arbitration agreement’s validity. This represents an 
application of the Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle. This principle 
was not respected by the proposal contained in the Green Paper, 
which, in order to verify the arbitral agreement’s validity, 
admitted the sole recourse to the judge of the arbitration’s seat.29 
At the same time, the option of the judge of the seat or 
arbitral tribunal represents a compromise for those Member 
States that are not so arbitration friendly to accept the negative 
effect of the Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle and to accept an 
arbitral statement on jurisdiction. Thus, the above article seems to 
reduce the risk of parallel proceedings as well as to represent a 
 
27 In Van Uden case (fn 10). 
28 RADICATI DI BROZOLO L.G. (fn 1), at 456 ff. 
29 See fn 23. 
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good alternative option to the more invasive and criticized 
remedy of anti-suit injunctions. 
One criticism that may result under the system provided by 
Article 29(4) is that the party who wishes to make use of the 
arbitration agreement and to avoid a judgment in the State where 
it is sued, is almost forced to introduce another, ordinary or arbi-
tration, proceedings to verify the validity of the arbitration 
agreement. This is so especially when a party believes that the 
non-seat court will uphold its position.30 
However, the mechanism provided by Article 29(4) in the 
Commission’s Proposal does not require the adoption of the rules 
on the arbitration agreement’s validity and effectiveness, not 
recognized by the Regulation (Recital 11). Merely raising an 
arbitration exception, together with proceedings that verify the 
effects of the arbitration agreement before the judge of the seat or 
the arbitral tribunal, is sufficient to freeze the proceedings started 
in violation of an arbitration agreement. Such a mechanism is 
open to abuses, since the Regulation does not provide for any 
definition of arbitration agreement and the non-seat judge is 
prevented by any assessment on its existence and validity.  
There is always the possibility to refer a question to the Court 
of Justice about the real meaning of arbitration agreement. This 
would force the Court to lay down some rules on the requi-
rements for the arbitration agreements’ validity (although this 
might conflict with the exclusion of the matter from the appli-
cation of the Regulation). 
During the analysis of the existence of an arbitration 
agreement, the non-seat court could not refer to its national law 
because it would frustrate the effects of the new rule (and the 
decision on suspension by the non-seat judge may lead again to 
parallel proceedings). Also a verification of the arbitration 
agreement’s existence pursuant to the law of the Member State of 
the seat, does not seem to be an effective solution because the 
non-seat judge, as happened in Dallah case,31 could apply and 
interpret that law differently and even be in contrast with the 
interpretation of the seat judge. 
 
30 RADICATI DI BROZOLO L.G. (fn 1), at 440. 
31 Paris Court of Appeal, 17 February 2011, Gouvernment du Pakistan v 
Société Dallah Real Estate & Tourism Holding Co, Cahiers arb. 2011, at 433 ff, 
cf also the commentary by CUNIBERTI G., ibid.; Dallah Real Estate & Tourism 
Holding Company v The Ministry of Religious, Government du Pakistan [2010] 
UKSC 46 (on appeal from [2009] EWCA Civ 755). 
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Thus, the mechanism of Article 29(5) has to be interpreted as 
follows and hope that no abuse will occur.32 The mere raising of 
an arbitration objection, based on the sole existence of the 
arbitration agreement, together with the related declaratory pro-
ceedings left to the arbitrators or to the judges of the seat, is 
sufficient to stop the jurisdiction of the court. 
Also, the innovative approach of the Proposal is clear in 
respect to the established Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle. The 
mechanism provided by Article 29(4) is able to limit the 
jurisdiction of the courts of certain Member States, imposing on 
them an assessment of the validity of the arbitration agreement 
made by other Member States’ judges or by arbitrators. It is a 
mechanism based on the consolidated EU principle of mutual 
trust among Member States.33 
Furthermore, the primary role of the judge of the seat and of 
the lex arbitri is clear. The consequence is that the choice of the 
seat will become even more decisive for the destiny of arbi-
tration.34 Also the trend will be always towards arbitration 
friendly States and towards countries adopting liberal inter-
pretation of arbitration agreements. In the light of the above, it 
may be said that the effectiveness of the new provision is con-
ditioned on the choice of a seat favorable to arbitration. 
 
5. In the light of the above and “on a not prejudicial analysis” 
against the European Commission,35 the Commission’s Proposal 
in the field of arbitration may be considered appropriate, as the 
partial abolition of the arbitration exception is formulated. 
 
32 RADICATI DI BROZOLO L. G. (fn 1), at 442 ff. The same Author indicates 
the possible interpretations mentioned here and the exclusion of their 
applicability. 
33 However, there are those who argue that the principles of mutual trust 
and mutual recognition are not suitable for arbitration because there are too 
many differences between arbitrators and courts and between judgments and 
awards. In this sense, see DRAETTA U./SANTINI A. (fn 5), at 553 f. 
34 Too much emphasis on the seat of arbitration does not seem a problem, 
especially for a mechanism (such as the one of the last Proposal) that includes, 
besides the possibility to bring the proceedings on the validity of the arbitration 
agreement before the court of the seat, the possibility alternatively to bring the 
proceedings before the arbitral tribunal. The expression “too much emphasis” is 
used by DRAETTA U., SANTINI A. (fn 5), at 553, referring to the Green Paper’s 
proposal recognizing an exclusive jurisdiction (only) to the courts. 
35 RADICATI DI BROZOLO L.G., “L’arbitrato e la proposta di revisione del 
Regolamento Bruxelles I”, Riv. arb. 187 ff, esp. at 230. 
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It seems to be consistent with the goal to avoid, as much as 
possible, parallel proceedings and abusive litigation tactics in 
such circumstances. This is done by means of a rule, the lis 
pendens rule, which does not bring particular disadvantages, 
interferences with other supranational laws, or steps backward. 
On the contrary, it seems representing a development in the 
arbitration law. Having placed on the same level the decisions by 
arbitrators and judges regarding the arbitration agreement’s 
validity and effects, this represents a development of the Kom-
petenz-Kompetenz principle. Moreover, it does not appear to be 
inconsistent with the international conventions currently in force, 
in particular with the New York Convention. Indeed, it may be 
considered complementary to it. Article 29(4) of the Proposal 
seems in a certain way to complete Article II(3) of the New York 
Convention by coordinating judges of Member States and their 
decisions on arbitration agreements’ validity and effects. 
In addition, the Proposal and its new mechanism of lis 
pendens (that highlights the importance of the seat of arbitration) 
could be an opportunity for Italy and similar countries to change 
their image as a country hostile to arbitration, i.e. a country not 
frequently chosen as a seat for international arbitration. Italian 
courts, in assessing the validity of arbitration agreements ‒ either 
incidenter tantum during a proceedings on the merits of the 
dispute, or in a declaratory proceedings, whenever invested as a 
“court[s] of the Member State where the seat of arbitration is 
located” under the new mechanism provided for by Article 29(4) 
‒ will have the opportunity to remove jurisdiction from certain 
countries and to assign it to an arbitral tribunal, according to a 
broad and favorable interpretation of the arbitration agreement. 
The previous proposals, in particular the one contained in the 
Green Paper, did not deserve much support and their purposes 
have been considered too ambitious (despite the declaration of 
intent “not for the sake of regulating arbitration”). By imposing 
European regulation of arbitration, this Proposal simply aims to 
avoid some of the problems faced in Europe over these years of 
application of the Brussels I Regulation, New York Convention 
and national laws. 
Besides its positive aspects, some of the solutions included in 
the Proposal can be certainly criticized. The mechanism of 
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Article 29(4) may be considered counterproductive,36 implying a 
sort of obligation for the party who relies on the arbitration 
agreement to start ordinary or arbitral proceedings in order to 
verify its validity. The suspension without any time limit 
provided by the new mechanism also appears a critical aspect, as 
well as the inapplicability of the recognition rules to judgments in 
arbitration matters.  
Finally, the new mechanism may lead the European Union 
“to put a foot in the door to the world of arbitration”.37 It is 
sufficient to think about the possible interventions of the Court of 
Justice on the new provisions in the arbitration field, being the 
Regulation’s inapplicability not sufficient to prevent the Court’s 
intervention. In this respect, we can only place our hope in the 
Court of Justice to be favor arbitrati and without prejudices.  
 
36 This is a definition used by the Milan Chamber of Arbitration 
commenting on the proposal of the Green Paper. In its Position Paper (see § 1), 
the Chamber argues that the need for a declaratory judgment at the seat court, 
“instead of enforcing the parties’ will to solve their dispute out of court, … will 
inevitably favor a race to the court”. In this regard, it is necessary to point out 
again that in the Green Paper’s proposal, the declaration of validity of the 
arbitration agreement must necessarily come from the court of the seat (and not, 
in the alternative, by the arbitral tribunal) and that the seat was, as we have seen, 
is ill-defined. Now the mechanism, with the possibility to bring the proceedings 
on the validity of the arbitration agreement before the arbitral tribunal, is 
partially changed, and the problem of the enforcement and its consequences are 
highly reduced. For this reason, perhaps the new mechanism should no longer 
be defined with that adjective.  
37 RADICATI DI BROZOLO L.G. (fn 1), at 457. 
